We consider the problem of constructing a general protocol for secure two-party computation in a way that preserves security under concurrent composition. In our treatment, we focus on the case where an a-priori bound on the number of concurrent sessions is specified before the protocol is constructed (a.k.a. bounded concurrency). We make no set-up assumptions.
Introduction
The task of secure two-party computation involves two parties that wish to evaluate a functionality f (x, y) = (f 1 (x, y), f 2 (x, y)) of their corresponding private inputs x and y. The evaluation process should supply the first party with the value f 1 (x, y) and the second party with the value f 2 (x, y) (one may also consider probabilistic functionalities in which case f (x, y) is a random variable). Loosely speaking, the security requirement is that neither party learns more from the protocol other than the output, and that the output of each party is distributed according to the prescribed functionality. This should hold even in case that either one of the parties maliciously deviates from the protocol instructions. Shortly after its conceptualization, very strong results have been established for secure two-party computation. Specifically, it has been shown that any probabilistic polynomial-time computable two-party functionality can be securely computed, assuming the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations [35, 22] .
Secure Two-Party Computation in the Concurrent Setting
The original setting in which secure two-party protocols were investigated allowed the execution of a single instance of the protocol at a time (this is the so called stand-alone setting). A more realistic setting, however, is one which allows the concurrent execution of protocols. In the concurrent setting (originally introduced in the context of zeroknowledge [17, 15] ), many two-party protocols are executed at the same time, involving many parties which may be talking with the same (or many) other parties simultaneously. This setting presents the new risk of a coordinated attack in which an adversary controls many parties, interleaving the executions of the protocols and choosing messages based on other partial executions of the protocol.
Unfortunately, security of a specific protocol in the stand-alone setting does not necessarily imply its security in the (more demanding) concurrent setting. It is thus of great relevance to examine whether the original feasibility results for two-party computation (in the stand-alone setting) still hold when many copies of the protocol are executed concurrently. Indeed, concurrent composition of cryptographic protocols has received a considerable amount of attention recently.
Many of the works that deal with protocol composition strongly rely on the existence of some kind of trusted set-up assumption. In some cases the usage of set-up assumptions seems to be necessary (e.g., Universal Composability [7, 12, 11] ). However, it is not clear that for other types of protocol composition one cannot do without them (e.g., concurrent zero-knowledge [33, 24, 32] , nonmalleable string commitment [14, 2] ).
In this paper we consider the problem of constructing a concurrently composable protocol for secure two-party computation. In contrast to most of the previous work in this area [7, 8, 12] , and in accordance with recent work by Lindell [26] , our goal is to construct a protocol that does not require any set up assumptions.
Previous Work

Composition Using Set-Up Assumptions
The literature discusses a wide array of set-up assumptions, most notably the timing assumption [15, 16] , the PublicKey models [9, 13] and the Common Reference String (CRS) model [7, 12] . Whereas the former assumptions have been primarily used to obtain concurrent composition of zero-knowledge, the latter assumption has been also used to obtain strong composition theorems for secure two-party computation. Specifically, in the model assuming the existence of a Common Reference String, it has been shown how to achieve the very strong notion of Universal Composability (UC) for both two-party and multi-party secure computation [7, 12] .
The universal composability setting (introduced by Canetti [7] ) is even more demanding than the concurrent setting considered in this paper. It allows many sets of possibly different parties to run many protocols, and secure protocols may run concurrently with arbitrary other protocols. Security of a protocol in the UC setting would imply its security in the concurrent setting (as a special case). Unfortunately, the possibility of obtaining univeral composability without making any set-up assumptions (i.e., in the plain model) has been ruled out for a large class of functionalities [7, 8, 11] . This indicates that the notion of universal composabilty might be too strong to be realized in a meaningful way without making any set-up assumptions.
Recent work also seems to indicate that the CRS model might not reflect the security concerns that one would like to adress in reality [31] . Loosely speaking, standard simulation-based definitions of security in the CRS model do not cover certain "natural" security properties that are satisfied in the plain model (e.g., deniability of protocols). Moreover, known impossibility results for composition in the plain model (e.g., [10, 26] ) will apply to any protocol that satisfies these "natural" security properties in the CRS model.
Concurrent Secure Two-Pary Computation
So far, the only treatment of concurrent two-party computation without set-up assumptions has been given by Lindell [26] . The definitional approach taken by Lindell is somewhat analogous to the approach taken by earlier works on concurrent zero-knowledge [15, 10] . Loosely speaking, the setting in which a two-party protocol should be proved to be secure involves a single (or many) honest parties that are running many concurrent executions of the same protocol. The honest parties are trying to protect themselves from a malicious adversary that controls a subset (or all) of the parties it is interacting with. Since it seems unrealistic (and certainly undesirable) for honest parties to coordinate their actions so that security is preserved, one must assume that in each instance of the protocol the honest party acts independently.
The conclusions reached by Lindell were mostly negative in nature. His main result is that any protocol for concurrent secure two-party computation, whose security is established via black-box simulation, must have round complexity that is strictly larger than the number of concurrent executions of the protocol. In particular, black-box simulation cannot be used in order to establish the security of two-party protocols when arbitrarily many protocols are allowed to run concurrently. Lindell's lower bound stands in sharp contrast to the case of zero-knowledge for N P where it has been shown that logarithmically many rounds are sufficient for black-box simulation in the concurrent setting [33, 24, 32] .
Falling short of providing a concurrently composable protocol for secure two-party computation, Lindell resorts to the model of bounded concurrency. In the model of bounded concurrency, first considered by Barak [1] in the context of zero-knowledge, it is assumed that an a-priori bound on the number of concurrent sessions is specified before the protocol is constructed. As shown by Barak, it is possible to construct a constant-round bounded-concurrent zero-knowledge protocol for all languages in N P [1] . This goes well below previous impossibility results showing that logarithmically many rounds are necessary for black-box simulation of (even bounded) concurrent zeroknowledge [10] . Indeed, the security of Barak's protocol is proved using non black-box simulation techniques. Interestingly, it is still open whether it is at all possible to extend Barak's techniques to construct an unbounded concurrent zero-knowledge protocol (even using a super-constant number of rounds). Using Barak's protocol, Lindell constructs a protocol for bounded concurrent secure two-party computation. The main feature required from Barak's protocol in the context of secure two-party computation is that its simulator does not make use of rewinding (a simulation technique inherent to black-box simulation [20, 25, 10] ). In this context, the low round-complexity of Barak's protocol does not play a significant role.
Unfortunately, Lindell's protocol also relies on blackbox simulation. As a consequence, the round-complexity of Lindell's protocol is severely limited by his own lower bound (on black-box simulation of concurrently composable secure two-party computation). Indeed, the number of rounds in the protocol is required to be strictly larger than the number of allowed concurrent sessions!
Our Results
Motivated by the above discussion, one might wonder whether Lindell's negative results are inherent to his definition of concurrent composition of two-party protocols (or even to any other "natural" definition of concurrency). Given the current state of knowledge, it is still conceivable that "non-trivial" concurrent composition of secure twoparty protocols is beyond reach without resorting to some kind of set-up assumption (somewhat analogously to the situation in Universal Composability). In light of this, any protocol for (even bounded) concurrent two-party computation with "non-trivial" round-complexity would be interesting. 1 In this work we address the above question and present a result of a positive nature. While our focus has been on feasibility, we also obtain the best one could hope for in terms of round-complexity. Specifically, we show how to construct a constant-round protocol for realizing boundedconcurrent secure two-party computation.
The security of our protocol relies on the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations [18] , as well as on the existence of strong collision resistant hash functions (i.e., so that for some κ > 0 forming collisions with probability greater than 2 On the Cryptographic Assumptions Used. The above theorem relies on slightly strong, nevertheless standard, assumption on collision resistance of hash functions. As it turns out from our proof, this assumption can be somewhat relaxed to require the existence of both one-way functions that are hard to invert for sub-exponential sized circuits and of hash functions that are collision-resistant for quasi-polynomial sized circuits.
On the Model of Concurrency. The concurrent setting considered in this paper follows Lindell's treatment [26] which, in turn, is adapted from previous works on concurrent zero-knowledge. We consider a single (or many) honest parties that are running many concurrent executions of the same two-party protocol. The honest parties are trying to protect themselves from a malicious adversary that controls a subset (or all) of the parties it is interacting with. In each instance of the protocol the honest party is required to act independently. As observed by Lindell [26] , this setting is equivalent to the case where many different pairs of parties run a protocol concurrently where each party is designated to be either a first party P 1 or a second party P 2 (this defines the role that it plays in the protocol execution). The adversary is then only allowed to corrupt a subset of the parties playing P 1 or a subset of the parties playing P 2 ; but cannot corrupt both parties P 1 and P 2 simultaneously. We further require that the adversary is non-adaptive, that is, the corrupted parties are chosen before the begining of the interaction.
Techniques
Our work relies in part on the works by Canetti, Lindell, Ostrovsky and Sahai [12] and Lindell [26] . The first of these works develops tools for proving security of twoparty protocols in the framework of universal composability in the CRS model. The second work demonstrates how to use some of these tools in order to reduce the problem of concurrent composition of two-party protocols to the construction of special-purpose zero-knowledge protocols in the plain model. Once this reduction is provided, all that is required is to implement such protocols without resorting to any set-up assumption. Our first contribution is a conceptual simplification of Lindell's reduction. We do this by introducing a new type of adversary, called a non-abusing adversary. More details on such adversaries can be found in Sections 3.1.
The main technical ingredient of our work is the construction of two new special-purpose zero-knowledge protocols. These protocols satisfy the following extra properties:
Round efficiency: Both protocols have a constant number of rounds.
Bounded Concurrency: Both protocols retain their zeroknowledge property under bounded concurrent composition, even in presence of messages from other protocols.
Non-rewinding simulation:
The simulators establishing the concurrent zero-knowledge property of the protocols do not use rewinding. Here we rely on Barak's non black-box simulation techniques [1] . In our setting, however, the simulator might simltaneously act as a prover in one protocol and as a verifier in another protocol. This introduces technical difficulties that Barak's protocol was not designed to deal with, and requires the usage of new ideas for performing the simulation.
Simulation Soundness: The protocols are simulationsound with respect to each other. That is, the soundness of each one of the protocols is preserved even when the other protocol is simulated at the same time with the roles of the prover and verifier reversed. This introduces technical issues related to nonmalleability [14] . The main problem here is to guarantee simulation-soundness for both protocols. Different solutions are required for each one of the protocols due to the symmetric nature of the problem. In one direction we use the idea of complexity leveraging (previously used in the context of resettable zero-knowledge and simulation in quasi-polynomial time [9, 30] ). In the other direction, we introduce a new technique that enables us to prove simulation-soundness in a direct manner.
We feel that some of the techniques that we use for simulating the zero-knowledge protocols and for proving simulation-soundness might find application elsewhere. More details on our zero-knowledge protocols can be found in Section 3.2.
Future work
This paper essentially settles the question of boundedconcurrent composition of secure two-party computation. One issue that deserves improvement, however, is the strength of the underlying cryptographic assumptions.
Perhaps the most important open question in the context of concurrent composition is to establish whether it is possible to achieve unbounded concurrent composition of two-party protocols. This seems to require new ideas for improving currently known non black-box simulation techniques (due to Barak [1] ). As a first step one could settle for super-constant round-complexity. We mention that, even in this relaxed case, nothing is known.
Another important question is whether one can achieve concurrently composable multi-party computation without an honest majority and without making any set-up assumptions. It seems that the techniques presented here do not suffice for achieving such a result.
Organization
Definitions of bounded-concurrent secure two-party computation can be found in Section 2. Section 3 contains a high level description of our proof, as well as a description of our new zero-knowledge protocols.
Definitions
In this section we present the definition for m-bounded concurrent secure two-party computation. Our definitions follows the ones of Lindell and we here present an abreviated version, taken almost verbatim from [26] . The basic description and definition of secure computation follows [23, 28, 5, 6] . We denote computational indistinguishability by ≡, and the security parameter (and, for simplicity, the lengths of the parties' inputs) by n.
Two-party computation.
A two-party protocol problem is cast by specifying a random process that maps pairs of inputs to pairs of outputs (one for each party). We refer to such a process as a functionality and denote it f : {0,
. That is, for every pair of inputs (x, y), the output-pair is a random variable (f 1 (x, y), f 2 (x, y)) ranging over pairs of strings. The first party (with input x) wishes to obtain f 1 (x, y) and the second party (with input y) wishes to obtain f 2 (x, y).
In the context of concurrent composition, each party receives a vector of inputs of polynomial length, and the aim of the parties is to jointly compute f (x i , y i ) for every i.
Adversarial behavior. In this work we consider a malicious, static adversary. That is, the adversary controls one of the parties (who is called corrupted) and may then interact with the honest party while arbitrarily deviating from the specified protocol. The focus of this work is not on fairness. We therefore present a definition where the adversary always receives its own output and can then decide when (if at all) the honest party will receive its output. The scheduling of message delivery is decided by the adversary.
Security of protocols (informal).
The security of a protocol is analyzed by comparing what an adversary can do in the protocol to what it can do in an ideal scenario that is secure by definition. This is formalized by considering an ideal computation involving an incorruptible trusted third party to whom the parties send their inputs. The trusted party computes the functionality on the inputs and returns
the real protocol (where no trusted third party exists) can do no more harm than if it was involved in the above-described ideal computation.
Concurrent execution in the ideal model. The ideal execution is defined as follows: The honest party sends all its inputs to the trusted party. The adversary thereafter sends its input in any order that it wishes to the trusted party, and directly receives the output. In particular, since we are considering a concurrent setting the adversary can schedule the order in which all protocols take place and choose its inputs adaptively. Finally, the adversary decides which outputs the honest party will recieve and sends a list of indexes to the trusted party, which in turn sends the output of these executions to the honest party. The honest party then outputs the results obtained from the trusted party, while the adversary can output an arbritrary function of its initial state and the messages obtained from the trusted party.
Let p(n) be a polynomial in the security parameter, let
* be a functionality, and let S be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine (representing the adversary). Then, the ideal execution of f (on input vectors (x, y) of length p(n) and auxiliary input z to S), denoted IDEAL f,S (x, y, z), is defined as the output pair of the honest party and S in the above ideal execution.
We note that the definition of the ideal model does not include any reference to the bound m on the concurrency. This is because this bound is relevant only to the scheduling allowed to the adversary in the real model; see below.
Execution in the real model. We next consider the real model in which a real two-party protocol is executed (and there exists no trusted third party). Let p(n) and m = m(n) be polynomials, let f be as above and let Π be a two-party protocol for computing f . Furthermore, let A be a nonuniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine that controls either P 1 or P 2 . Then, the real m-bounded concurrent execution of Π (on input vectors (x, y) of length p(n) and auxiliary input z to A), denoted REAL m Π,A (x, y, z), is defined as the output pair of the honest party and A, resulting from p(n) executions of the protocol interaction, where the honest party always inputs its i th input into the i th execution.
The scheduling of all messages throughout the executions is controlled by the adversary. The bound on concurrency requires that the scheduling by the real model adversary must fulfill the following condition: for every execution i, from the time that the i th execution begins until the time that it ends, messages from at most m different executions can be sent.
Security as emulation of a real execution in the ideal model.
Having defined the ideal and real models, we can now define security of protocols. Loosely speaking, the definition asserts that a secure two-party protocol (in the real model) emulates the ideal model (in which a trusted party exists). This is formulated by saying that for every realmodel adversary there exists an ideal model adversary that can simulate an execution of the secure real-model protocol.
Definition 1 (Security in the malicious model) Let m = m(n) be a polynomial and let f and Π be as above. Protocol Π is said to securely compute f under m-bounded concurrent composition if for every real-model nonuniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A controlling party P i for i ∈ {1, 2}, there exists an ideal-model nonuniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S controlling P i , such that for every polynomial p(n),
Strengthening the definition. Definition 1 is rather simplistic in that it assumes that all inputs are fixed before any execution begins. We remark that our result also holds for a more general definition where inputs for later executions can depend on outputs of earlier executions.
Proof Outline
In this section we give a high-level outline of our proof, as well as a description of our new special-purpose zeroknowledge protocols. More details can be found in the full version.
The structure of our proof follows that of Lindell [26] . On a very high level, the proof can be divided into two parts. The first part shows how to reduce the problem of constructing a concurrently composable two-party protocol to the task of implementing two special-purpose zero-knowledge protocols. This part mainly follows [26] while introducing a new notion that conceptually simplifies the proof. It is described in Sections 3.1.
The second part involves the construction of the specialpurpose zero-knowledge protocols. This part builds on Barak's bounded-concurrent zero-knowledge argument [1] as well as on new ideas related to non-malleability and concurrent simulatability. It is described in Section 3.2.
Reducing the Problem to Special-Purpose ZK
Idealized Functionalities
Our starting point is the protocol of Canetti et al. [12] . In their paper, they show that the task of concurrently composable secure two-party computation can be achieved in a setting where the parties have access to a specific idealized functionality. 2 The notion of ideal functionalities is a central tool in the framework of universal composability [7] , and can be thought of as the introduction of a trusted third party that is designed to perform a specific task. In the case of Canetti et al. [12] , the protocol requires usage of the ideal zero-knowledge proof of knowledge functionality.
The IdealZK functionality. Informally, the ideal zeroknowledge proof of knowledge functionality (called IdealZK) for an N P-relation R is specified as follows: The prover sends an instance-witness pair (x, w) to the ideal functionality which, in turn, sends (x, 1) to the verifier if (x, w) ∈ R and (x, 0) otherwise.
The setting in which the parties have access to (multiple) ideal zero-knowledge functionalities is called the ZKHybrid model. Our motivation (as was also the motivation of Lindell [26] ) is to remove the usage of the ideal zeroknowlegde functionality and implement a protocol that performs the same task but in the real model. If done in an appropriate way, this would give rise to a concurrently composable two-party computation protocol.
A natural (yet naïve) approach to implement such a protocol, would be to instantiate each idealized zeroknowledge call in the protocol of [12] with an invocation of a concurrent zero-knowledge argument. However, as pointed out in [26] , this approach lacks in several aspects:
• The notion of concurrent zero-knowledge only considers the composition of the zero-knowledge protocol with itself. In the more complicated setting of secure two-party computation, it is essential that the protocol is zero-knowledge not only when being composed with itself, but also when being composed with other protocols running at the same time.
• In the setting of concurrent two-party computation, it is conceivable that a party acts as a prover in one session, while simultaneously acting as a verifier in a different session. (This problem does not occur in the setting of concurrent zero-knowledge, since each party is either a verifier or a prover.) Thus the problem of malleability arises: It is possible for an adversary to use 2 The result by Canetti et al. [12] is in fact stronger, as they construct a protocol that is universally composable [7] . Nevertheless, in this work we only require composition in the (less demanding) concurrent setting. One advantage arising from the usage of the protocol of [12] as a starting point is that it enables us to avoid many technicalities that arise when proving a general theorem on secure two-party computation from scratch.
messages from a proof that it is receiving in a proof that it is giving. 3 In order to achieve the above mentioned task, we show a general transformation that transforms any protocolΠ in the ZK-Hybrid model into a protocol Π in the real model (without any ideal functionalities or set-up assumptions). This is what we call realizing the ZK-Hybrid model. Jumping ahead, we mention that this part also includes the construction of the special-purpose zero-knowledge protocols (as will be described in Section 3.2). We further show that the transformation satisfies the following properties:
Concurrency: The protocol's security is preserved under (bounded) concurrent composition.
Round-Efficiency:
The protocol's round-complexity is preserved (up to a constant factor).
In particular the transformation can be applied to the protocol of [12] to obtain a bounded concurrent secure two-party computation protocol.
How to Realize Protocols in the ZK-Hybrid Model
The above transformation is performed in two steps:
1. Reduce the usage of the IdealZK functionality to the usage of a weaker (and easier to implement) ideal functionality. This functionality is named the WeakZK functionality.
2. Show how to transform any protocol using the WeakZK functionality into a protocol in the real model by "plugging in" the special-purpose protocols.
The WeakZK functionality. The first step consists of reducing the usage of IdealZK to the usage of WeakZK. (This reduction might be of independent interest as it in fact also is applicable in the multi-party setting withoutany bounds on concurrency). The latter functionality was introduced in [26] as a technical tool and is (informally) specified as follows: The prover sends a pair (x, b) to the ideal functionality which, in turn, sends (x, b) to the verifier if x ∈ L and (x, 0) otherwise (where b ∈ {0, 1}).
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The difference between the IdealZK and the WeakZK functionalities can be described as follows. While in the IdealZK functionality the prover needs to supply both a
of validity. The extra bit b is used to let the prover "fail" in proving even true statements (clearly, one cannot force the prover to prove something if he does not want to do so). We call a model where parties have access to the WeakZK functionality, the WeakZK-Hybrid model.
Non-abusing adversaries. We note that the WeakZK functionality is not efficiently computable since, in general, it might be hard to decide whether a given instance belongs to an N P language without possessing a witness. This complicates the reduction from the usage of the IdealZK functionality to the usage of the WeakZK functionality. To overcome this problem, we introduce the notion of nonabusing adversaries. Non-abusing adversaries exist only in the WeakZK-Hybrid model. These adversaries (almost) always make "proper" usage of the WeakZK functionality. That is, they always explicitly tell the WeakZK functionality if the statement x is false by sending (x, 0) to it. (We mention, however, that an non-abusing adversary may send (x, 0) to the ideal functionality, even if x ∈ L). In other words, non-abusing adversaries only send values (x, b) that would make the WeakZK functionality send (x, b) to the verifier. Thus, for non-abusing adversaries the WeakZK functionality is efficiently computable.
Reducing between the hybrid models. Taking care of the above issue will enable us to show that any protocolΠ in the ZK-Hybrid model can be transformed into a protocol Π in the WeakZK-Hybrid model, such that any non-abusing adversary in the WeakZK-Hybrid model can be simulated in the ZK-Hybrid model. This in particular means that, in the transformation between the two hybrid models, security is preserved. The proof of this statement makes use of a generic transformation of a zeroknowledge argument into a zero-knowledge argument of knowledge [4] . Now, in order to show how to realize any protocol in the ZK-Hybrid model, it remains to show how to transform any protocol Π in the WeakZK-Hybrid model into a protocol Π in the real model. This should be done in a way than enables simulation of any adversary in the real model by a nonabusing adversary in the WeakZK-Hybrid model. Here we will also require the extra property that the simulator for the instantiated zero-knowledge proof does not make use of rewinding. 5 Jumping ahead, we mention that in order to
show that the simulation can be done by a non-abusing adversary we will need to instantiate the calls to the WeakZK functionality by invocations of zero-knowledge protocols that are simulation-sound with respect to each other.
Completing the Reduction. The proof of the previous lemma thus boils down to the construction of two specialpurpose zero-knowledge protocols satisfying the following requirements:
1. Both protocols compose concurrently with respect to arbitrary protocols.
2. Simulation of the protocols does not make use of rewinding.
3. The protocols are simulation-sound with respect to each other. That is, the soundness of each one of the protocols is preserved even when the other protocol is simulated at the same time with the role of the prover and verifier reversed.
The Special-Purpose ZK Protocols
Our special purpose zero-knowledge protocols are based on the bounded-concurrent ZK protocol of Barak [1] . Barak's protocol relies on the existence of strong collision resistant hash functions. Other tools used in the protocol are perfectly binding bit-commitments [29, 19] and a witnessindistinguishable universal argument (WI UARG) [3] .
We start by giving a brief description of this protocol with an emphasis on a key property of its simulator. This property will enable us to perform simulation in our setting. More details on Barak's protocol can be found in [1] . The underlying idea behind Barak's protocol is the usage an N T IM E(n log n ) relation denoted R sim .
Input:
A triplet h, c, r .
Witness:
A program Π, a string y ∈ {0, 1} (|r|−n) , and a string s. Let T : N → N be a "nice" function that satisfies T (n) = n ω (1) . Let T : N → N be a function such that T (n) = T (n) ω (1) . Suppose there exist a T (n)-collision resistant hash functions ensemble {H n } h∈{0,1} n where h maps {0, 1} * to {0, 1} n . Barak's protocol is described in Figure 2 below.
n presumably in L, security parameter 1 n , length parameter (n).
Stage 1:
Stage 2:
P ↔ V : A WI UARG proving the OR of the following two statements:
1. ∃ w ∈ {0, 1} poly(|x|) so that RL(x, w) = 1. As shown in [1], Barak's protocol is computationally sound. Moreover, given access to the verifier's code (or, equivalently, to the verifier's next message function), the protocol can be simulated without making use of rewinding. To simulate a specific session, the simulator commits to the verifier's next-message function (instead of committing to zeros). The verifier's next message function is then a program whose output depends on all the prover messages sent between messages c and r in the relevant session. Now, if the length of all these messages is bounded by (n) − n the simulator will have a valid witness for stage 2 of the protocol. The zero-knowledge property then follows (with some work) from the witness indistinguishable property of stage 2.
Barak [1] has shown that the length of the prover's messages in a single execution can be bounded by 2n 2 . Thus, for m concurrent executions, taking (n) = 2m · n 2 + n would do. We note that the length of the verifier's messages, not counting r's, can also be bounded by 2n
2 . An important extra feature of the protocol is that it is in fact sufficient that the simulator has a "short" description of the prover's messages. The protocol is thus simulatable even if the total length of prover's messages is greater than (n) − n, as long as the simulator has a description of a program for generating the prover's messages that is shorter than (n) − n.
Our protocols. Let f be a one-way function with an efficiently recognizable range set, and let κ > 0 be so that f is not invertible by circuits of size 2 n κ . 6 Let k = 1/κ + 1, T (n) = n log k+1 n , and let T (n) be a super-polynomial function such that T (n) = T (n) 1/ω (1) . Suppose there exist a T (n)-collision resistant hash functions ensemble {H n } h∈{0,1} n as required by Barak's protocol. We are ready to describe our special purpose protocols, cZK 1 and cZK 2 (depicted in Figures 3 and 4) .
Common Input: an instance x ∈ {0, 1} n presumably in L, security parameter 1 n , length parameter (n).
Stage 1:
V → P : Send h R ← Hn. P → V : Send c1 = Com(0 n ). V → P : Send r1 R ← {0, 1} (n) . P → V : Send c2 = Com(0 n ). V → P : Send r2 R ← {0, 1} (n) .
Stage 2:
P ↔ V : A WI UARG, that is sound against adversaries running in time T (n) = n log k+1 n , proving the OR of the following three statements: Simulating the protocols. The difference between cZK 1 and the protocol of Barak is that in cZK 1 the prover (simulator) is given two opportunities to guess the verifier's next message. We call each such opportunity a slot. Messages that are exchanged between the message c i and the message r i are said to be contained in slot i. Note that it is sufficient to have a "short" description of the messages contained in either slot 1 or slot 2 to succeed in the simulation of cZK 1 . cZK 2 is obtained by combining the quasi-polynomial time simulatable protocol of Pass [30] with the protocol of Barak. Note that, besides using Barak's technique to simulate in polynomial time, one can simulate cZK 2 by running in time n O(log k n) and inverting the one-way function by brute-force.
Let (n) = m(k · 4n 2 + length(Π )) + n, where Π denotes the protocol in the WeakZK Hybrid model (that we wish to realize) and k is the total number of ideal zeroknowledge calls in one execution of Π . We note that the total length of messages sent by a party, not including the r's in cZK 1 , cZK 2 , is bounded by m(k · 2n 2 + length(Π )), as both the length of the prover messages and verifier messages in cZK 1 , cZK 2 is bounded by 2n 2 . It follows that if the simulator can give a description of the various r's (each being of length (n)) that is shorter than n 2 it will always succeed in the simulation of cZK 1 ,cZK 2 . We hint that this is done by letting the simulator use a pseudorandom generator in order to generate verifier messages when playing the role of the verifier in other protocols.
Soundness in the stand-alone setting. By using a hash function that is secure against T (n)-adversaries one can ensure that cZK 1 is sound against T (n) adversaries. It is straightforward to see that the functions T (n) and T (n) satisfy the requirements needed to guarantee the soundness of the interactive argument.
As for cZK 2 , soundness against polynomial time adversaries follows using the same argument as in [30] , by combining the proof of knowledge property of the universal argument and the fact that the one-way function is hard to invert in sub-exponential time.
Simulation soundness. The last step is to guarantee that the soundness of each one of cZK 1 ,cZK 2 is not violated when simulating the other protocol with the roles of the prover and verifier reversed. To do this we show how to transform a cheating prover in this simulation/cheating scenario into a cheating prover for the stand alone case.
Suppose there exists a cheating prover P * that manages to violate the soundness of one instance of protocol cZK i while it is verifying the simulation of multiple concurrent instances of the other cZK protocol. We show how to construct a cheating prover P * * for a single instance of cZK i 7 To remove the efficient recognizability requirement from f , one could let V prove using a Witness Hiding proof that there exists an inverse to q under f .
by forwarding the messages of this "cheating" instance of cZK i to an external honest verifier V (the instance in which P * is actually cheating can be "guessed" by picking one of the instances of cZK i at random). V 's replies are then forwarded by P * * back to P * as if they were generated by the simulator. Since P * is assumed to be cheating in this specific instance of cZK i , and since the verifier messages used by P * * are actually the messages used by V , the (standalone) soundness of cZK i is presumably violated.
One final (subtle) issue that should be handled is that the code of V is not available to us. This means that the straightforward simulation of cZK i cannot be completed as it is (since it explicitly requires possession of a "short" explanation of the corresponding verifier messages). To overcome this problem we resort to alternative simulation techniques in each one of the protocols.
Simulating cZK 2 while verifying cZK 1 : In this case we use the alternative simulator for cZK 2 (running in time n O(log k n) ). Note that this simulation technique does not require the verifier's code. Due to the W I property of the U ARG, the presumed cheating prover will still succeed to convince an honest verifier of protocol cZK 1 with roughly the same probability. Since soundness of cZK 1 is guaranteed against provers running in time n log k+1 n we derive a contradiction.
Simulating cZK 1 while verifying cZK 2 : In this case we use the fact that it is sufficient to have a short description of the messages sent in either the first or the second slot of cZK 1 since the honest verifier's r message (to be "explained") can occur in at most one of the slots, polynomial time simulation is guaranteed. Again, the W I property of the U ARG guarantees that the the presumed cheating prover will still succeed to convince an honest verifier of protocol cZK 2 with roughly the same probability.
